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Can Humanism Be an Environmentalism?  








I have, from the perspective of environmental education, attached 
myself to that “significant current of opinion in environmentalist circles 
[that] has chosen to repudiate what its adherents call ‘humanism’.”1 I 
have argued that there is more sense in seeing humanism as the root 
cause of the current environmental crisis than capitalism because 
capitalism is (like socialism) a child of humanism.2 I have more 
recently argued, on the basis of a “fully semiotic” or biosemiotic 
perspective, that the boundaries of the human are more porous than has 
commonly been held in the Western tradition, and that therefore a 
“posthumanist” perspective is called for that both draws on the 
humanist tradition and goes beyond it.3 In none of these works have I 
suggested that humanism is undesirable; merely that it does not have 
the potential to adequately address environmental problems. 
I am grateful to Lewis Hinchman for demanding that I, and like-minded 
commentators, take a more nuanced and generous view of humanism. 
However, I remain unconvinced of his final argument. In this paper, I 
shall therefore attempt to critique and refine his argument. This will be 
a differently focused critique from that already offered by Brian 
Baxter,4 though I am sympathetic to Baxter’s defence of the possible 
usefulness of socio-biology (indeed, of biology generally) in tackling 
environmental problems. I shall make further reference to Baxter’s 
critique from time to time.  
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To avoid any suggestion of an ad hominem attack (which is certainly 
unintended), Hinchman’s argument will hereafter be referred to as HA. 
Firstly, I shall question whether there is a consistent and identifiable 
argument. 
HA maintains that environmental concern has always been an aspect of 
humanism. What has caused a “growing estrangement”5 between them 
is not the fault of humanism but rather of deterministic and reductive 
socio-biology. Ultimately, HA’s main concern seems methodological: 
to separate those whose interests are humanistic in the sense of 
“practising the methods of the humanities”6—“phenomenology, 
existentialism, . . . hermeneutics”7 and general critique—from those 
whose science is dominated, or even tinged, by “behaviourism and 
positivism.”8 HA draws this circle very wide, so that figures such as 
Kant and Marcuse are enlisted as humanists. As Baxter9 asserts, surely 
it is an extreme claim that such non-humanistic approaches (carefully 
excluded from a very wide pantheon) can tell us nothing of value about 
the very nature that we are attempting to study, preserve and enhance. 
Indeed, HA has little to say about how humanistic commentators might 
make use of hard science, but many do. Indeed, the current wave of 
concern about global warming is prompted by such science, since its 
effects on human experience are, as yet, very limited in countries such 
as the UK and US. At the end,10
HA is entitled “Is Environmentalism a Humanism?” but this is merely 
rhetorical, even disingenuous, as the author has already made up his 
mind that it is. At no point is any counter-position seriously considered. 
The point of HA would therefore seem more accurately to argue the 
 HA does acknowledge this (“Learning 
to read the land requires a long apprenticeship in several fields of 
natural science”) but should not be “ahistorical and abstract…like 
physics.”  This is surely to erect a straw man; in this case the scientist 
who is not also a human being. If it were the common practice of 
scientists to have no humanity, this would indeed be a concern, but 
there are no grounds for assuming that this is so. Science does not make 
us understand the world. Human beings undertake science and interpret 
its results; there is a human agent employing the scientific methods. 
Science is undertaken within the phenomenal worlds of real human 
beings. This does not totally invalidate Hinchman’s concerns, since 
people might well pay too much attention to science and too little to 
(say) phenomenology or hermeneutics, but the argument cannot validly 
proceed on the assumption that science is an entirely a-human activity. 
The Trumpeter 88 
case that environmentalism is grounded in humanism rather than 
discuss whether it is. What looks from the title to be a hypothesis is not 
actually tested in the Popperian sense of subjecting it to attempts at 
falsification, and what seems to be a possible conclusion is, in effect, 
taken also as a premise. Indeed, it is not clear how the premises differ 
from the conclusion or, indeed, what they are. On this view, HA is 
rather an assertion with evidence than a reasoned argument. It should be 
evaluated, therefore, in terms of the strength of that evidence. 
My next concern is whether the proposition itself is clear and 
consistent. 
We might ask whether the assertion, the claim of HA, is clear and 
consistent in itself, and what it actually amounts to. It is not entirely 
clear. Even within the Abstract, we are told both that “Humanism has 
much closer affinities to environmentalism than the latter’s advocates 
believe” and that Aldo Leopold’s Sand County Almanac is “the 
paradigm case of environmental thought with roots in humanist 
approaches.”11
This, however, was not the original question; indeed, no such question 
is clearly evident in the first part of the paper. It also looks from the 
above as though the paper is grounded in the assumption that 
“environmental theory” is grounded in “naturalism or biologism,” but 
this is itself questionable, and an alternative position will be developed 
in the following section. HA is surely right to assume that 
environmentalists draw on biology and naturalistic assumptions, but it 
 However, there is a difference between having roots in 
something and having close affinities with it, and even close affinities 
do not amount to synonymity. (Maybe “roots” don’t either.) Regarding 
the first point: it might be argued that both dialectical materialism and 
Nazism (as an expression of German Romantic nationalism) have 
“roots” in Hegel, or that both fascism and postmodernism have “roots” 
in Nietzsche. Regarding the second, humanism might have “close 
affinities” with environmentalism but be subsumed within it rather than 
(as HA maintains) the reverse. I have close affinities with the Welsh, 
since my wife comes from there and my son was born there; this does 
not mean I am Welsh. Indeed, I could deny strongly that I was Welsh 
without severing my ties with that nation. However, this is not a 
possibility HA considers with respect to humanism vis-à-vis 
environmentalism. 
The assertion of HA is not clear from the start, therefore. However, by 
the end the confusion is compounded. On page 24, we read: “Returning 
to our original question, namely whether environmental theory is 
irredeemably committed to a naturalism or biologism that humanists 
must spurn, we can now conclude that it is not.” 
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cannot be inferred from this that they draw on nothing else, even if they 
cast themselves as anti-humanist (notwithstanding Baxter’s published 
riposte in defence of biology). There is a wealth of literature, for 
example, on Darwin as a cultural figure with, furthermore, strong 
concerns for the position and dignity of humanity.12
An interesting question arises here concerning the valid ground rules 
for critique. HA dismisses as invalid any conception of humanism that 
is not grounded in the academic literature: “If one wants to attack a 
particular mode of thought, one should confront its most coherent, well-
thought out embodiments, not its vaguer, popular forms.”
 
The central assertion of HA is neither clear nor consistent, therefore, 
and where it attempts clarity is does so partly by oversimplification. 
Nevertheless, there is a clear message, even if this falls short of an 
entirely satisfactory proposition; it runs something along the lines of 
there being more environmentalism in the humanist tradition than is 
often acknowledged, so environmentalism is heavily indebted to 
humanism and neglects that debt at its peril. We are, indeed, offered 
many illuminating and convincing examples of environmental concern 
in early humanist thought.  
I shall next consider the evidence base in HA. 
13 Surely the 
validity of this depends on the context of the debate. My child’s teacher 
might judge that my child is intelligent or unintelligent, or makes an 
effort or does not make an effort, thereby operationalizing outmoded (in 
academic terms) or ill-understood conceptions of unitary intelligence 
and effort uninformed by the latest psychological literature. Would it be 
invalid, on these grounds, to critique such teachers? Would there be no 
value in researching what schools think they are doing when they assess 
children for effort, on the grounds that they do not have academically 
robust understandings of the concept? Clearly not, in either case: in 
such instances, it is professional or lay understandings that are 
important. Environmentalism, like education, is a vast and barely 
definable field embracing many actors with many agendas. The way 
things are understood in the real world are, on this account, very fit 
matters for debate—as, one might expect, a historian, hermeneuticist or 
phenomenologist (whose methods are lauded in HA) would 
acknowledge. An academic critique should surely be grounded in a 
thorough understanding of the relevant academic literature but, at the 
same time, in the context of the application of that literature within the 
popular debate. There are many people who subscribe to humanist 
beliefs and even organisations. I maintain that such conceptions of 
humanism should be considered, albeit in a rigorously academically 
informed context. Not to do so would be the equivalent of discussing 
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Marxism with relation to social policy but with no attention whatever to 
its manifestations and effects in espousedly Marxist states: an approach 
which might, it must be acknowledged, have certain attractions for 
committed academic Marxists. Humanism as now popularly understood 
is therefore fit matter (albeit not all the fit matter) for such a critique. In 
this case, therefore, those for whom “humanism is . . . associated with a 
style of technocratic management,”14 for example, should not have their 
impressions simply dismissed as invalid; rather, one might attempt to 
understand the genealogy of such a position. This is not, of course, to 
claim that such construals cannot be regarded as unfortunate or 
mistaken interpretations of core ideas, as long as the case is made; the 
point is that such construals have explanatory power for 
environmentalists that cannot so easily be brushed aside.  
The HA commitment to academic rigour above, which might amount to 
a form of smoke-and-mirrors in the present case, allows HA to avoid 
engaging with a very simple point of critique that has not, as far as I 
know, been addressed in the academic literature on humanism to which 
HA refers. This is that humanism was not developed in a historical and 
cultural context in which there was any perceived danger of human 
beings destroying or damaging nature itself, using up natural resources, 
or destroying the planet. These were simply not concerns for Early 
Modern and Enlightenment people, nor even, arguably, for most 
twentieth-century phenomenologists or critical theorists, whose work, I 
agree,15 is grounded in humanist assumptions. Unfortunately, as this 
(very simple) point of criticism is not grounded in the academic 
literature sanctioned by HA, it would presumably be dismissed as 
invalid.  
My final criticism is that, while HA eschews critique from beyond a 
certain literature, it simultaneously embraces sources that may not 
universally be accepted as humanist. Notably, it includes Marxist 
humanists such as Marcuse, and other figures for whom an argument 
can clearly made that they are in some senses humanist, although they 
are often not seen as leading exponents. A key example in HA is that of 
Kant. A number of figures associated with critical theory and 
existentialism are also included. One example is that of Jaspers. 
According to the current entry in the Stanford Encycplopedia of 
Philosophy, for example: 
Arguably, Jaspers was always a humanist; certainly, if humanism is 
defined as a doctrine which seeks to account for the specificity, 
uniqueness and dignity of human life his work can, from the outset, be 
seen as a variant on philosophical humanism.16 
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This is a guarded acceptance of Jaspers as a humanist. Such liminality 
is not to be found in HA, where a humanist tradition is set firmly 
against a reductive, naturalistic one, with no acknowledgement of 
possible blurring of boundaries. It is this all-or-nothing approach that I 
shall attempt to problematize in the next section. 
In conclusion, HA offers a rich and illuminating tour of major sites 
associated with the humanist tradition. It does not attempt to critique 
that tradition but only that which is set against it. However, this 
polarization is set up without much attempt at reasoned argument.  
 
The Limits of Humanity and Humanism:  
An Attempt at Clarification 
HA is premised on the assumption (though it is also its conclusion) that 
the human lifeworld cannot be reduced to (mere) nature. Implicit in this 
is the view that human beings, as free, reasoning, moral, feeling agents 
sit above the natural, for which they are responsible—hence the sense 
of hurt at the charge that humanism cannot be environmentalist. 
I question the basis of the assumption of complete qualitative 
distinction between human and non-human nature, arguing (as many 
have before) that it is based on an untenable Cartesian substance 
dualism.17 My own attempt to problematize that dualism lies in 
questioning the sign-signal distinction; I argue, for example, that John 
Dewey, who attempted to unify “body-mind”18 was prevented from his 
strongly naturalistic bias from unifying signal and sign.19 On the 
grounds of this “fully semiotic” account, I have argued that humanistic 
accounts are inherently inadequate to satisfactorily address 
environmental problems. 
First, let us consider what is at stake here. The vast majority of 
environmentalists want good lives—as good lives as possible—for 
themselves and their successors on Earth. In general, therefore, 
notwithstanding many environmentalists’ opposition to economic 
growth, there is no fundamental threat to humanism from 
environmentalists on that basis. The argument is rather over the basis 
on which such a future can be secured. HA warns us against a 
dehumanizing naturalism here, while some environmentalists, myself 
included, are wary of a scheme that clearly sets human concerns apart 
from non-human interests (in the broadest sense).  
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Let us attempt some clarification of the human–non-human divide prior 
to discussing the implications arising from such a clarification for the 
present debate. 
Suppose that my phenomenal world, incorporating the sum total of my 
present experience, and involving my different awarenesses of past and 
future, can be referred to as my “My Now” (MMN). This is a 
phenomenologically, or phenomenographically, or existentially derived 
definition, though as comprehensive as possible on those terms. It does 
not attempt, for example, to clarify the nature of “now” beyond “what I 
am experiencing.” It accepts as valid that I have experience. 
Furthermore, this experience carries with it traces, of previous “nows” 
and awareness of other experiencing persons. Again, it cannot be 
proved ultimately that “Your My Now” (YMN) is real for you, but, on 
the basis that you are likely to respond that you do experience, I can 
safely posit that the world comprises not only My My Now but also as 
many Your My Nows as there are people in the world. At least, 
therefore, I can conclude that the totality of phenomenal experience 
comprises MMN + YMNn (to the power of n). Insofar as all knowledge 
and understanding can be construed as human understanding, all 
knowledge and understanding is, indeed, contained within this 
collective human phenomenological world. On this view, the “rest of 
nature” is non-experiencing, and is therefore apt for (responsible) use as 
standing-reserve, or resource, for humans. It would be appropriate to 
think only of human beings in terms of constructs such as betterment, 
spirituality, aspiration responsibility, morality, reason and intelligence; 
there would be little argument for, say, animal rights. This, it can be 
argued, is the basis of the humanist tradition, from the Renaissance to 
critical theory. However, even humanists do not always accept this 
account at face value. For example, many humanists may embrace the 
notion of cruelty to animals, but if animals feel pain or other forms of 
hurt, then they have phenomenal worlds. 
Ironically, and not at all in the spirit of HA—though very much in the 
spirit of Baxter’s response—research in the positivist sciences has 
increasingly pointed us, in recent years, towards an acknowledgement 
that other animals have phenomenal worlds. Not only do we share 
nearly all our genetic material with chimpanzees, for example: we also 
share some capacity for tool use and language.20 Furthermore, such 
acknowledgements take no account of the possibility that other species 
are likely to have experiences we cannot have as humans, though 
science (again) makes it seems extremely unlikely that this is not the 
case: one thinks of the dolphins’ capacity to communicate, for example, 
and there may be many capacities of which we are fully unaware, not 
least because of the limits of our human senses. We know that other 
 
 
Volume 24, Number 3 
 
93 
animals share our senses, and that, in many cases, they are much more 
acute than ours. 
Even a limited acknowledgement of non-human phenomenal worlds, 
such as that animals can “feel” in some way we only dimly recognize, 
problematizes the basis of the humanist world view. It does not 
completely invalidate it, since it does not deny that human beings might 
be special—chosen by God to govern the Earth, even—but it does 
problematize it if we have duties not only to other people but to non-
human sentient beings.  
If there are other “My Nows” (OMN) beyond the human, this has no 
implication for the limits of human understanding, which remains the 
collective understanding of human beings. However, it does render that 
understanding partial in a new sense, since the whole phenomenal 
world is now MMN+YMNⁿ+OMNⁿ. Furthermore, we have no idea how 
far the collective OMN extends. It may be that only higher mammals 
are sentient. Alternatively, on a fully pansemiotic account, for 
example,21 everything in the universe “lives” in terms of responding to 
signs or signals, or both, where the sign-signal distinction is unclear, 
and where this may even embrace artificial intelligence. Such an 
account problematizes the category of life itself and not merely that of 
the human. There is much here that we do not confidently know, but 
this uncertainty serves to problematize the human–non-human 
distinction as much as any other. It may be relevant to note here that 
humanism is not easily compatible with animism and has flourished in 
contexts where the latter has declined or disappeared. 
In addition, it is apposite to question the borders of the human from 
within the human. These are by no means clear in all contexts. For 
example, under current English law, a foetus is not human (in the sense 
of enjoying human rights) whereas a victim of brain damage kept alive 
only by machinery is. Indeed, some might argue (such as Finkielkraut 
2001) that many, or most, people in the world are not regarded as fully 
human, and it is clearly the case that certain groups, in certain contexts, 
are denied the human rights due to others. It is also clear that the 
phenomenal worlds of both the foetus and the brain-damage victim are 
likely to be radically different from those of healthy children and adults. 
Furthermore, the human is increasingly cyborg with each new piece of 
life-enhancing technology, from spectacles and hearing aids to 
prosthetic limbs and pacemakers, not to mention our dependence on 
certain companion animals.22
On the above grounds, I maintain that we cannot safely make absolute 
qualitative distinctions between the human and the non-human, though 
we are inevitably anthropocentric in the sense of seeing the world 
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through human eyes and maintaining prior concern not only for our 
own species but for those closest to us (variously defined) within it. I 
further maintain that this either falls short of, or transcends humanism 
though it bears affinities to it and, indeed, has some of its roots (but not 
all of them) within it. In arguing for a posthumanist approach to policy 
and practice, I, for one, am not arguing for a rejection of humanism, but 
rather for an acknowledgement that it simply is not enough. Asking 
humanism to solve the environmental crisis is like asking a plumber to 
make it rain. It is “language go[ing] on holiday” in Wittgensteinian 
terms.23
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